Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices - 2003
Released
by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor From the State Department
The
Islamic Republic of Iran [note 1] is a constitutional, theocratic republic in
which Shi'a Muslim clergy dominate the key power structures. The Supreme Leader
of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, dominates a tri-cameral
division of power among legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Khamene'i
directly controls the armed forces and exercises indirect control over the
internal security forces, the judiciary, and other key institutions. The
executive branch was headed by President Mohammad Khatami, who won a second 4-year
term in June 2001, with 77 percent of the popular vote in a multiparty election.
The legislative branch featured a popularly elected 290-seat Islamic
Consultative Assembly, Majlis, which develops and passes legislation. Reformist
and moderate candidates won a landslide victory for 4-year terms in the 2000
Majlis election, gaining a clear majority of that body. However, the 12-member
Guardian Council, which reviews all legislation passed by the Majlis for
adherence to Islamic and constitutional principles, blocked much of the reform
legislation. The 34-member Expediency Council is empowered to resolve
legislative impasses between the Guardian Council and the Majlis. The
Constitution provides that "the judiciary is an independent power";
however, the judicial branch is widely perceived as heavily biased against pro-Khatami
reformist forces.
Several
agencies share responsibility for law enforcement and maintenance of order,
including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of Interior,
and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp, a military force established after
the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known as Basijis, and various
gangs of men known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers of the Party of God), or
more simply "plain clothes," acted as vigilantes aligned with extreme
conservative members of the leadership. Civilian authorities did not fully
maintain effective control of the security forces and there were instances in
which elements of the security forces acted independently of government
authority. The regular and the paramilitary security forces both committed
numerous, serious human rights abuses.
The mixed
economy depends on oil and gas for 80 percent of its export earnings. The
population was approximately 68 million. All large-scale industry is publicly
owned and administered by the State. Large para-statal charitable foundations
called bonyads, most with strong connections to the clerical regime, controlled
as much as a third of the country's economy and exercised considerable
influence. The Government heavily subsidized basic foodstuffs and energy costs.
Government mismanagement and corruption negatively affected economic
performance. The official unemployment rate was approximately 16 percent,
although other estimates were higher. Estimated inflation was 17 percent with
economic growth at 6 percent during the year.
The
Government's poor human rights record worsened, and it continued to commit
numerous, serious abuses. The right of citizens to change their government was
restricted significantly. Continuing serious abuses included: summary
executions; disappearances; torture and other degrading treatment, reportedly
including severe punishments such as beheading and flogging; poor prison conditions;
arbitrary arrest and detention; lack of habeas corpus or access to counsel and
prolonged and incommunicado detention. Citizens often did not receive due
process or fair trials. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights,
and restricted freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and religion.
An
intense political struggle continued during the year between a broad popular
movement favoring greater liberalization in government policies, particularly
in the area of human rights, and certain hard-line elements in the Government
and society, which viewed such reforms as a threat to the survival of the
Islamic Republic. In many cases, this struggle was played out within the
Government itself, with reformists and hard-liners squaring off in divisive
internal debates. As in the past, reformist members of parliament were
harassed, prosecuted, and threatened with jail for statements made under
parliamentary immunity.
The
Government restricted the work of human rights groups; however, it permitted
visits during the year by the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the
U.N. Special Rapporteur for the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression. Violence and legal and societal
discrimination against women were problems. The Government restricted the work
of human rights groups. The Government discriminated against minorities and
severely restricted workers' rights, including freedom of association and the
right to organize and bargain collectively. Child labor persisted. Vigilante
groups, with strong ties to certain members of the Government, enforced their
interpretation of appropriate social behavior through intimidation and violence.
There were reports of trafficking in persons.
In
October, lawyer and human rights activist Shirin Ebadi was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize for her work in advancing human rights both in the country and
internationally.
RESPECT
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1
Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
a. Arbitrary
or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
There
were reports of political killings. The Government was responsible for numerous
killings during the year, including executions following trials in which there
was a lack of due process. Government affiliated vigilante groups also were
responsible for extrajudicial killings.
The law
criminalized dissent and applied the death penalty to offenses such as "attempts
against the security of the State, outrage against high-ranking officials, and
insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini and against the Supreme Leader of
the Islamic Republic." Citizens continued to be tried and sentenced to
death in the absence of sufficient procedural safeguards.
Exiles
and human rights monitors alleged that many of those supposedly executed for
criminal offenses, such as narcotics trafficking, actually were political
dissidents. Supporters of outlawed political groups, or in the case of the
Mujahedin-e Khalq, a terrorist organization, were believed to constitute a
large number of those executed each year.
In July,
an Iranian-Canadian photographer, Zahra Kazemi, died in custody after being
arrested for taking photographs at Evin prison in
Two political
activists associated with the outlawed Komala party, Sassan al-Kanaan and
Mohammad Golabi, were executed in February and March. The Democratic Party of
Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), an opposition party, alleged that the Government
executed party member Jalil Zewal in December, after 9 years in prison during
which he was reportedly subjected to torture. KDPI member Ramin Sharifi was
also executed in December after his arrest in July. Mohammad Golabi was
reportedly tortured while in detention. Sassan al-Kanaan's execution was
reportedly carried out while his mother was in
The 1998
murders of prominent political activists Darioush and Parvaneh Forouhar,
writers Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Pouyandeh, and the disappearance of
political activist Pirouz Davani continued to cause controversy about what is
perceived to be the Government's cover-up of involvement by high-level
officials. Prominent investigative journalist Akbar Ganji, who was arrested in 2000
and sentenced to 6 years in prison for his reporting on the case, remained in
prison (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). In 2001, the Special Representative for
b. Disappearance
Little
reliable information was available regarding the number of disappearances
during the year.
The
Government announced that approximately 4,000 persons--both protesters and
vigilantes--were arrested in connection with pro-reform protests in June and
stated that roughly 2,000 remained in jail in mid-July. There were no reliable
statistics to indicate how many protestors were still being held at year's end.
According
to Baha'i sources, since 1979 15 Baha'i have disappeared and are presumed dead.
The KDPI noted the continued detention of six Iranian Kurds arrested in 1996
with no subsequent word on their whereabouts. The Families of Iranian Jewish
Prisoners (FIJP) have heard anecdotal stories that some of 12 Jewish citizens,
who disappeared while attempting to escape from the country in the 1990s, were
being held in prison (see Section 2.c.).
c. Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The
Constitution forbids the use of torture; however, there were numerous credible
reports that security forces and prison personnel continued to torture
detainees and prisoners. Some prison facilities, including
In
August, the Council of Guardians rejected a bill on accession to the U.N. Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
The Majlis amended the bill in late December, reportedly addressing Council of
Guardians concerns over the monetary costs of joining the convention. The
Council of Guardians also rejected in mid-2002 a bill passed by the Majlis to
end torture and forced confessions.
In July 2002,
in an effort to combat "un-Islamic behavior" and social corruption
among the young, the Government announced the formation of a new "morality
force." The force was meant to enforce the Islamic Republic's strict rules
of moral behavior. Press reports indicated that members of this force chased
and beat persons in the streets for offenses such as listening to music, or in
the case of women, wearing makeup or clothing that was not modest enough (see
Section 1.f.). While not uniformly enforced, in November, 7 women in
In March,
activist Siamak Pourzand was re-imprisoned after his provisional release in
November 2002. After his arrest in 2001, Siamak Pourzand was tried in March 2002
behind closed doors and sentenced to 11 years in prison for "undermining
state security through his links with monarchists and counter-revolutionaries."
Press reports said that he had confessed to his crimes at his trial, but his
wife claimed that the confession was extracted under duress. Pourzand suffered
severe health problems while held incommunicado, reportedly including a heart
attack, and was allegedly denied proper medical treatment. At year's end, he
remained in jail.
In April,
Former Deputy Prime Minister and longtime political dissident, Abbas Amir-Entezam
was re-imprisoned, after his release in 2002 for medical reasons. Amir-Entezam
was reportedly incarcerated for calling for a referendum on whether the country
should remain under clerical rule during a speech at
In July,
an Iranian-Canadian photographer, Zahra Kazemi, died in custody as a result of
a blow to the head (see Section 1.a.).
In
November, four men were reportedly sentenced to death by stoning for
involvement in kidnapping and rape. In December 2002, the Government officially
suspended the practices of amputation and lapidation or stoning--a form of
capital punishment for adultery and other crimes, although the law has not been
rescinded.
During
the year, Amnesty International (AI) reported at least six cases of amputation.
Prison
conditions in the country were poor. Some prisoners were held in solitary
confinement or denied adequate food or medical care to force confessions. After
its February visit, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions reported
that "for the first time since its establishment, [the Working Group] has
been confronted with a strategy of widespread use of solitary confinement for
its own sake and not for traditional disciplinary purposes." The Working
Group described Sector 209 of Evin Prison as a "prison within a prison,"
designed for the "systematic, large-scale use of absolute solitary
confinement, frequently for long periods."
The 2001
report by the UNSR noted a significant increase in the prison population and
reports of overcrowding and unrest. In March, the nongovernmental organization (NGO)
Penal Reform International (PRI) reported that 180,000 prisoners occupied
facilities constructed to hold a maximum of 65,000 persons. In July, the head
of the National Prisons Organization (NPO) assessed the number of prisoners at 156,000.
The UNSR
reported that much of the prisoner abuse occurred in unofficial detention
centers run by the secret service and military. The UNSR further reported that
the unofficial detention centers were to be brought under the control of the
NNPO during 2001; however, November press reports indicated that a number of
unofficial detention centers continued to operate outside NPO control. The U.N.
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention raised this issue with the country's
Article 90 Parliamentary Commission, generating a Commission inquiry that
reportedly confirmed the existence of numerous unofficial prisons.
In March,
PRI announced a cooperative initiative with authorities to improve prison
conditions through workshops and training of judges and prison administrators. The
report of the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted that the judicial
authorities expressed the need for prison reform, but observed that
implementation had been limited.
The
Government generally has not granted access to human rights monitors other than
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); however, it permitted
visits to imprisoned dissidents by U.N. human rights officials during the year (see
Section 4). U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention officials visited Evin
prison in
d. Arbitrary
Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The
Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, these practices
remained common. There is reportedly no legal time limit for incommunicado
detention, nor any judicial means to determine the legality of detention. In
the period immediately following arrest, many detainees were held incommunicado
and denied access to lawyers and family members. Suspects may be held for
questioning in jails or in local Revolutionary Guard offices.
The
security forces often did not inform family members of a prisoner's welfare and
location. Authorities often denied visits by family members and legal counsel. In
addition, families of executed prisoners did not always receive notification of
the prisoners' deaths. Those who did receive such information reportedly were
forced on occasion to pay the Government to retrieve the body of their relative.
In
January, the Government released Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, amid reports
of health problems after 5 years of house arrest. Montazeri was formerly the
designated successor of the late Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who
became an outspoken critic of the Supreme Leader (see Section 2.a.). In recent
years, the Government has used the practice of house arrest to restrict the
movements and ability to communicate of senior Shi'a religious leaders whose
views regarding political and governance issues were at variance with the
ruling orthodoxy.
In July,
the press reported that Iranian-American academic Dariush Zahedi was detained
during a private visit to the country and reportedly held in solitary
confinement in Evin prison. Parliament officials noted that Zahedi was held on
suspicion of espionage but, after a 40-day investigation, was cleared by the
Ministry of Intelligence. However, Zahedi remained in detention after the case
was transferred to the judiciary, reportedly at the intervention of
In
November, security agents briefly arrested two sons of Ayatollah Hossein Ali
Montazeri, the dissident cleric released from house arrest in January (see
Section 1.d.). The arrests were reportedly in response to the sons' attempts to
refurbish a building purchased by the family for use as a teaching facility. The
Qom mosque and Koranic school at which Montazeri formerly taught has remained
closed since 1997, when comments by the cleric questioning the authority of the
Supreme Leader sparked attacks on the school and his home by Ansar-e Hezbollah
mobs.
In
November, student activist Ahmed Batebi met with the UNSR for the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, while on medical
leave from prison where he is serving a 15-year sentence for participating in
the 1999 student demonstrations. He was re-arrested shortly afterward and at
year's end, he was reportedly being held in Evin prison.
In July 2002,
the Government permanently dissolved the Freedom Movement, the country's oldest
opposition party, and sentenced over 30 of its members to jail terms ranging
from 4 months to 10 years on charges of trying to overthrow the Islamic system.
Other members were barred from political activity for up to 10 years, and
ordered to pay fines up to more than $6,000 (approximately 48,000 rials).
Numerous
publishers, editors, and journalists were either detained, jailed, and fined,
or were prohibited from publishing their writings during the year (see Section 2.a.).
Adherents
of the Baha'i faith continued to face arbitrary arrest and detention. According
to Baha'i sources, four Baha'is remained in prison for practicing their faith
at year's end, one facing a life sentence, two facing sentences of 15 years,
and the fourth a 4-year sentence. A small number of Baha'is were and have been
in detention at any given time. Sources claimed that such arrests were carried
out to "terrorize" the community and to disrupt the lives of its
members. Others were arrested, charged, and then quickly released. However, the
charges against them often were not dropped, generating continued apprehension (see
section 2.c.).
During
the year, the Government continued to exchange with
The
Government did not use forced exile, and no information was available regarding
whether the law prohibits forced exile; however, the Government used internal
exile as a punishment. Many dissidents and ethnic and religious minorities left
and continue to leave the country due to a perception of threat from the
Government.
e. Denial
of Fair Public Trial
The
Constitution provides that the judiciary is "an independent power";
however, in practice the court system was subject to government and religious
influence. It served as the principal vehicle of the Government to restrict
freedom and reform in the society. U.N. representatives, including the UNSR,
and the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and independent human rights
organizations noted the absence of procedural safeguards in criminal trials.
There are
several different court systems. The two most active are the traditional
courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses, and the Islamic
Revolutionary Courts. The latter try offenses viewed as potentially threatening
to the Islamic Republic, including threats to internal or external security,
narcotics and economic crimes, and official corruption. A special clerical
court examines alleged transgressions within the clerical establishment, and a
military court investigates crimes committed in connection with military or
security duties by members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary Guards. A
press court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers in the
media. The Supreme Court has limited review authority.
After the
revolution, the judicial system was revised to conform to an Islamic canon
based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic sources. Article 157 provides that
the Head of the Judiciary, currently Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi, shall
be a cleric chosen by the Supreme Leader. The head of the Supreme Court and
Prosecutor General also must be clerics. Women were barred from serving as
judges.
Many
aspects of the pre-revolutionary judicial system survived in the civil and
criminal courts. For example, defendants have the right to a public trial, may
choose their own lawyer, and have the right of appeal. Panels of judges
adjudicate trials. There is no jury system in the civil and criminal courts. If
post-revolutionary statutes did not address a situation, the Government advised
judges to give precedence to their own knowledge and interpretation of Islamic
law.
The U.N. Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention noted in its report failures of due process in the
court system, caused by the absence of a "culture of counsel" and the
concentration of authority in the hands of a judge who prosecutes,
investigates, and decides cases. The Working Group called for active
involvement of counsel in cases, from the custody and investigation phase
through the trial and appeals phases. The Working Group welcomed the 2002
reinstatement of prosecution services, after a 7-year suspension, but noted
that the reforms have thus far only been applied in three jurisdictions.
Trials in
the Revolutionary Courts, in which crimes against national security and other
principal offenses are heard, were notorious for their disregard of
international standards of fairness. Revolutionary Court judges acted as both
prosecutor and judge in the same case, and judges were chosen in part based on
their ideological commitment to the system. Pretrial detention often was
prolonged and defendants lacked access to attorneys. Indictments often lacked
clarity and included undefined offenses such as "anti-revolutionary
behavior," "moral corruption," and "siding with global
arrogance." Defendants did not have the right to confront their accusers. Secret
or summary trials of 5 minutes duration occurred. Others were show trials that
were intended merely to highlight a coerced public confession.
The
legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court (SCC) system continued to be a subject
of debate. The clerical courts, which investigate offenses and crimes committed
by clerics, and which are overseen directly by the Supreme Leader, were not
provided for in the Constitution, and operated outside the domain of the
judiciary. In particular, critics alleged that the clerical courts were used to
prosecute clerics for expressing controversial ideas and for participating in
activities outside the sphere of religion, such as journalism. The
recommendations of the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention included a
call to abolish both the Special Clerical Courts and the Revolutionary Courts,
which were described as "responsible for many of the cases of arbitrary
detention for crimes of opinion."
No
accurate estimates were available regarding the number of citizens imprisoned
for their political beliefs. In November, the UNSR for the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Expression and Opinion estimated the
number to be in the hundreds. The Government has arrested, convicted, and
sentenced persons on questionable criminal charges, including drug trafficking,
when their actual "offenses" were political. The Government has
charged members of religious minorities with crimes such as "confronting
the regime" and apostasy, and conducted trials in these cases in the same
manner as threats to national security.
In March 2002,
after a trial behind closed doors but with his lawyer present, Nasser
Zarafshan, the attorney representing the families of the victims of the 1998
extrajudicial killings of dissidents by intelligence ministry officials, was
sentenced to 5 years in prison and 70 lashes. He was charged with leaking
confidential information pertaining to the trial. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported
that he was also charged with "having weapons and alcohol at his law firm."
Zarafshan was originally arrested in 2000 but released after a month pending
trial. An appeals court upheld his conviction in July 2002. In November, the
Supreme Court reportedly dismissed his appeal (see Section 1.a.).
Several
other human rights lawyers were also reportedly abused, among them Mohammad
Dadkhah, who participated in the defense of members of the Iran Freedom
Movement and is a founding member of the Iranian Center for Protection of Human
Rights, and Abdol Fattah Soltani, who was reportedly charged for raising
accusations of torture during the 2002 defense of a number of political
prisoners. In 2002, Dadkhah was sentenced to 5 months in jail and banned from
practicing law for 10 years; Soltani was sentenced to 4 months in prison and
barred from practicing law for 5 years. Both men reportedly began their jail
terms in January. The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention included among
its recommendations the need for guaranteeing the immunity of counsel in
pleading cases as an essential element of the right to due process.
In November
2002, academic Hashem Aghajari was sentenced to death at a closed trial for the
crime of blaspheming against Islam during a speech in Hamedan. In addition to
the death sentence, he was sentenced to 74 lashes, exile to a remote desert
location, 8 years in jail, and a ban on teaching for 10 years. The death
sentence was widely denounced both domestically and abroad. President Khatami
and hundreds of Majlis members questioned the verdict. In February, the Supreme
Court revoked his death sentence, but the case was sent back to the lower court
for retrial. No verdict was issued by year's end (see Section 2.b.).
Former
Deputy Prime Minister and longtime political dissident, Abbas Amir-Entezam was
re-imprisoned in April, after his release in 2002 for medical reasons. Amir-Entezam,
who has spent much of the past 24 years in prison, was reportedly incarcerated
for calling for a referendum on whether the country should remain under
clerical rule during a speech at
The trials
in 2000 and 2001 of 13 Jewish citizens on charges related to espionage for
f. Arbitrary
Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The
Constitution states that "reputation, life, property, (and) dwelling(s)"
are protected from trespass except as "provided by law;" however, the
Government infringed on these rights. Security forces monitored the social
activities of citizens, entered homes and offices, monitored telephone
conversations, and opened mail without court authorization.
Vigilante
violence included attacking young persons considered too "un-Islamic"
in their dress or activities, invading private homes, abusing unmarried
couples, and disrupting concerts or other forms of popular entertainment. Attacks
targeted women whose clothing did not cover their hair and all parts of their body
except the hands and face, or those who wore makeup or nail polish.
Authorities
entered homes to remove television satellite dishes, or to disrupt private
gatherings in which unmarried men and women socialized, or where alcohol, mixed
dancing, or other forbidden activities were offered or took place. The
Government campaign against satellite dishes continued, although enforcement
appeared to be arbitrary and sporadic, varying widely with the political
climate and the individuals involved. Press reports from November noted that,
after a roughly 4-month hiatus, security authorities resumed efforts to remove
satellite dishes from
Section 2
Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom
of Speech and Press
The
Constitution provides for freedom of the press, except when published ideas are
"contrary to Islamic principles, or are detrimental to public rights;"
however, the Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press in
practice. Since the election of President Khatami, the independent press,
especially newspapers and magazines, played an increasingly important role in
providing a forum for an intense debate regarding reform in the society. However,
basic legal safeguards for freedom of expression did not exist, and the
independent press was subjected to arbitrary enforcement measures by elements
of the Government, notably the judiciary, which treated such debates as a
threat.
The
Government continued to harass senior Shi'a religious and political leaders and
their followers who dissent from the ruling conservative establishment. In July
2002, the Friday prayer leader of
In
October, reformist parliamentarian and outspoken critic Mohsen Armin was
sentenced to 6 months in prison for insulting a conservative parliament member,
according to press reports. The judge reportedly also stripped Armin of his "social
rights" for 1 year for not appearing in court. Armin ascribed his absence
from court to his assumption that he held parliamentary immunity. At year's
end, Armin had not been imprisoned.
In
January 2002, reformist members of Parliament staged a walkout to protest pro-reform
Parliamentarian Hossein Loqmanian's imprisonment, which led the Supreme Leader
to pardon him after he had spent several weeks in prison. In late 2001,
Loqmanian began serving a 13-month sentence for insulting the judiciary. He became
the first Majlis member to serve a jail sentence.
In spring
2001, security forces arrested parliament member Fatima Haghighatjoo for
inciting public opinion and insulting the judiciary for criticizing the arrest
of a female journalist and claiming that the Government tortured prisoners. She
was the first sitting Majlis member to face prosecution for statements made
under cover of immunity. Haghighatjoo was sentenced to 17 months in prison,
though she has not yet served time.
Newspapers
and magazines represented a wide variety of political and social perspectives,
many allied with members of the Government. Many subjects were tolerated,
including criticism of certain government policies. However, the Press Law
prohibits the publishing of a broad and ill-defined category of subjects,
including material "insulting Islam and its sanctities" or "promoting
subjects that might damage the foundation of the Islamic Republic." Prohibited
topics include fault-finding comments regarding the personality and
achievements of the late Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini; direct
criticism of the Supreme Leader; assailing the principle of velayat-e faqih, or
rule by a supreme religious leader; questioning the tenets of certain Islamic
legal principles; publishing sensitive or classified material affecting
national security; promotion of the views of certain dissident clerics,
including Ayatollah Montazeri; and advocating rights or autonomy for ethnic
minorities.
The Press
Law established the Press Supervisory Board, which is composed of the Minister
of Islamic Culture and Guidance, a Supreme Court judge, a Member of Parliament,
and a university professor appointed by the Minister of Islamic Culture and
Guidance. The Board is responsible for issuing press licenses and for examining
complaints filed against publications or individual journalists, editors, or
publishers. In certain cases, the Press Supervisory Board may refer complaints
to the
Since 2000,
approximately 100 newspapers and magazines have been closed for varying lengths
of time. In the last few years, some human rights groups asserted that the
increasingly conservative
Public
officials frequently lodged complaints against journalists, editors, and
publishers. Offending writers were subject to lawsuits and fines. Suspension
from journalistic activities and imprisonment were common punishments for
guilty verdicts for offenses ranging from "fabrication" to "propaganda
against the State" to "insulting the leadership of the Islamic
Republic."
Freedom
of the press continued to deteriorate during the year. Many newspapers and
magazines were closed, and many of their managers were sentenced to jail and,
sometimes, lashings. Several dozen pro-reform newspapers continued to publish,
most with heavy self-censorship. When shut down, others often opened to take
their place. A number of Internet news sites continued to operate from outside
the country. There is little information on the extent of readership inside the
country.
Dozens of
individual editors and journalists have been charged and tried by the
In
January, the judiciary halted efforts by deputy speaker of the Majlis, Mohammad-Reza
Khatami, to re-open the banned newspaper Norouz under the new name Rouz-e No,
by extending the 6-month ban on the original publication. Khatami was slated to
replace former Norouz editor and parliament member Mohsen Mirdamadi, who was
sentenced despite parliamentary immunity in May 2002 to 6 months in jail and
banned from practicing journalism for 4 years for "insulting the state,
publishing lies, and insulting Islamic institutions." At year's end, there
were no reports that Mirdamadi had been imprisoned.
In
January, the newspaper Hayat-e No was banned and editor Alireza Eshraghi
arrested after the paper reprinted a 1937 U.S. cartoon about President Franklin
Roosevelt's battle with the Supreme Court. The authorities deemed that the
judge portrayed too closely resembled the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The
daily Hamshahri was also temporarily suspended in January after refusing to print
an article from the chief of a state-run trade union.
In
January, the
In
February, according to AI, Abbas Abdi and Hussein Qazian, were sentenced to 8 and
9 years, respectively, in the National Institute for Research Studies and
Opinion Polls case. In April, an appeals court reduced the sentences to 4 years
and 6 months for each. The third defendant in the case, Behrouz Geranpayeh, was
reportedly released on bail in January, pending a final ruling. The case
originated in October 2002, when the judicial authorities closed the Institute
which had found in a poll commissioned by the Majlis that a majority of
citizens supported dialogue with the United States. The defendants were charged
with spying for the
In
October, RSF reported that the Government closed the newspaper Avay-e
Kordestan, marking the first time a Kurdish language newspaper was banned in
the country.
The
Government directly controlled and maintained a monopoly over all television
and radio broadcasting facilities; programming reflected the Government's
political and socio-religious ideology. Because newspapers and other print
media had a limited circulation outside large cities, radio and television
served as the principal news source for many citizens. Satellite dishes that
received foreign television broadcasts were forbidden; however, many citizens,
particularly the wealthy, owned them. In December 2002, the Majlis passed a
bill legalizing private ownership of satellite receiving equipment. However,
the Guardians Council rejected the legislation in January on constitutional and
religious grounds. The Government reportedly acted to block foreign satellite
transmissions during the year using powerful jamming signals (see Section 1.f.).
The
Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance was in charge of screening books prior
to publication to ensure that they did not contain offensive material. However,
some books and pamphlets critical of the Government were published without
reprisal. The Ministry inspected foreign printed materials prior to their
release on the market. In August, author of "
The
Government effectively censored domestic films, since it remained the main
source of production funding. Producers must submit scripts and film proposals
to government officials in advance of funding approval. However, such
government restrictions appeared to have eased in recent years.
The
Government censored Internet sites. In May, a government spokesman acknowledged
state attempts to block access to "immoral" websites. The judiciary
also announced the creation of a special unit to handle Internet-related issues.
According to press reporting, the judiciary highlighted over twenty subject
areas to be blocked, including: insulting Islam, opposing the Constitution,
insulting the Supreme Leader or making false accusations about officials,
undermining national unity and solidarity, creating pessimism among the people
regarding the Islamic system, and propagating prostitution and drugs.
The
Government restricted academic freedom. Government informers were common on
university campuses. Admission to universities was politicized; all applicants
had to pass "character tests" in which officials screened out
applicants critical of the Government's ideology. To obtain tenure, professors
had to refrain from criticism of the authorities.
b. Freedom
of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The
Constitution permits assemblies and marches "provided they do not violate
the principles of Islam;" however, in practice the Government restricted
freedom of assembly and closely monitored gatherings to prevent anti-government
protest. Such gatherings included public entertainment and lectures, student
gatherings, labor protests, funeral processions, and Friday prayer gatherings.
During a
wave of student protests in June, vigilantes beat many protestors, and police
arrested approximately 4,000 persons (both protestors and vigilantes),
according to government figures shortly after the protests. The Government
banned demonstrations planned for July 9 to commemorate the killing of several
students by security forces in demonstrations held in 1999 and arrested more
student activists at that time (see Sections 1.b. and 1.f.).
Paramilitary
organizations such as the Ansar-e Hezbollah, a group of vigilantes who seek to
enforce their vision of appropriate revolutionary comportment upon the society,
harassed, beat, and intimidated those who demonstrated publicly for reform. Ansar-e
Hezbollah gangs were used to harass journalists, intimidate dissident clerics,
and disrupt peaceful gatherings (see Section 2.b.). Ansar-e Hezbollah cells were
organized throughout the country and some were reportedly linked to individual
members of the country's leadership.
In June,
during a wave of pro-reform protests, members of vigilante groups, such as
Ansar-e Hezbollah, attacked protestors, according to press reports. Ansar-e
Hezbollah members reportedly stormed a university dormitory in
In
December, vigilantes beat reformist parliamentarian, Mohsen Mirdamadi, as he
began a speech in
In
November 2002, the Aghajari verdict sparked large and ongoing protests at
universities throughout the country (see Section 1.e.). Students boycotted
classes for almost 2 weeks and staged the largest pro-reform demonstrations in 3
years, with crowds of up to 5,000 at any given location. In late December 2002,
two students were given jail terms for their protests against the Aghajari
sentence. Hojatollah Rahimi was sentenced to 2 years in prison and 70 lashes
for "insulting religious sanctities and issuing an insulting declaration."
Co-defendant Parviz Torkashvand was sentenced to 4 months in jail and 40 lashes.
A
government clampdown using Basiji and other forces restored quiet for 2 weeks,
until a large demonstration occurred at the
The
Constitution provides for the establishment of political parties, professional
associations, Islamic religious groups, and organizations for recognized
religious minorities, provided that such groups do not violate the principles
of "freedom, sovereignty, and national unity," or question Islam as
the basis of the Islamic Republic; however, the Government limited freedom of
association, in practice.
In 2001,
the Government provisionally closed the 50-year-old Iran Freedom Movement
political party for "attempting to overthrow the Islamic regime," and
the Government permanently banned it in 2002. In response to the permanent
dissolution of the movement, President Khatami warned against the banning of
political groups, saying that suppression did not eliminate ideas; they were
simply forced underground and continue to grow (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
c. Freedom
of Religion
The Constitution
declares that the "official religion of Iran is Islam and the doctrine
followed is that of Ja'fari (Twelver) Shi'ism." the Constitution also
states that "other Islamic denominations are to be accorded full respect,"
and recognizes Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews, the country's pre-Islamic
religions, as "protected" religious minorities; however, in practice
The Government restricted freedom of religion. Religions not specifically
protected under the Constitution did not enjoy freedom of religion. This
situation most directly affected the approximately 300,000 followers of the
Baha'i faith, who were not recognized by the Government as a community and were
considered to belong to an outlawed political organization. The central feature
of the country's Islamic republican system is rule by a "religious
jurisconsult." Its senior leadership, including the Supreme Leader of the
Revolution, the President, the Head of the Judiciary, and the Speaker of the
Islamic Consultative Assembly (Parliament) was composed principally of Shi'a
clergymen.
The
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) monitored closely religious
activity. Adherents of recognized religious minorities were not required to
register individually with the Government. However, their community, religious,
and cultural organizations, as well as schools and public events, were
monitored closely. The population was approximately 99 percent Muslim, of which
89 percent were Shi'a and 10 percent Sunni (mostly Turkomans, Arabs, Baluchis,
and Kurds). Baha'i, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Jewish communities constituted
less than 1 percent of the population.
Members
of the country's religious minorities, particularly Bahai's, reported
imprisonment, harassment, and intimidation based on their religious beliefs. All
religious minorities suffered varying degrees of officially sanctioned
discrimination, particularly in the areas of employment, education, and housing.
The Government generally allowed recognized religious minorities to conduct
religious education of their adherents, although it restricted this right
considerably in some cases. Religious minorities, by law and practice, are
barred from election to a representative body, except to the five Majlis seats
reserved for minorities, and from holding senior government or military
positions. Members of religious minorities were allowed to vote, but they could
not run for President. Although the Constitution mandates an Islamic Army,
members of religious minority communities sometimes served in the military.
The
Government allowed recognized religious minorities to establish community
centers and certain privately-financed cultural, social, sports, or charitable
associations. However, since 1983 the Government has denied the Baha'i
community the right to assemble officially or to maintain administrative
institutions.
The legal
system discriminated against religious minorities, awarding lower monetary
compensation in injury and death lawsuits for non-Muslims than for Muslims and
imposing heavier punishments on non-Muslims than on Muslims. In April, the
Council of Guardians rejected a bill passed by the Majlis in late 2002
equalizing the "blood money" paid to the families of male crime
victims except for Bahai's. Proselytizing of Muslims by non-Muslims is illegal
and the Government was harsh in its response, in particular against Baha'is and
evangelical Christians. The Government did not ensure the right of citizens to
change or recant their religion. Apostasy, specifically conversion from Islam,
is punishable by death.
Although
Sunni Muslims are accorded full respect under the terms of the Constitution,
some Sunni groups claimed to be discriminated against by the Government.
Baha'is
were considered apostates because of their claim to a religious revelation
subsequent to that of the Prophet Mohammed. The Government defined the Baha'i
faith as a political "sect" linked to the Pahlavi monarchy and
therefore, as counterrevolutionary. Historically at risk, Baha'is often have
suffered increased levels of mistreatment during times of political unrest. Baha'is
may not teach or practice their faith or maintain links with co-religionists
abroad. The Government continued to imprison and detain Baha'is based on their
religious beliefs. A 2001 Ministry of Justice report indicated that government
policy aimed at the eventual elimination of the Baha'is as a community.
In 2001,
the UNSR estimated the Christian community at approximately 300,000. Of these,
the majority were ethnic Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans. Protestant
denominations and evangelical churches also were active, but reported
restrictions on their activities. The authorities became particularly vigilant
in recent years in curbing proselytizing activities by evangelical Christians.
Estimates
of the size of the ewish community varied from 25,000 to 30,000, a substantial
reduction from the estimated 75,000 to 80,000 Jews in the country prior to the 1979
revolution. While Jews were a recognized religious minority, allegations of
official discrimination were frequent. The Government's anti-Israel stance, and
the perception among many citizens that Jewish citizens supported Zionism and
the State of Israel, created a threatening atmosphere for the small community. Jews
limited their contact with and did not openly express support for Israel out of
fear of reprisal. Jewish leaders reportedly were reluctant to draw attention to
official mistreatment of their community due to fear of government reprisal.
The
Government carefully monitored the statements and views of the country's senior
Muslim religious leaders. It has restricted the movement of several who have
been under house arrest for years.
For a
more detailed discussion, see the 2003 International Religious Freedom Report.
d. Freedom
of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The
Government placed some restrictions on these rights. Citizens may travel within
the country and change their place of residence without obtaining official
permission. The Government required exit permits (a validation stamp in the passport)
for foreign travel for draft-age men and citizens who were politically suspect.
Some citizens, particularly those whose skills were in short supply and who
were educated at government expense, must post bonds to obtain exit permits. The
Government restricted the movement of certain religious minorities and several
religious leaders (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
Citizens
returning from abroad sometimes were subjected to searches and extensive
questioning by government authorities for evidence of anti-government
activities abroad. Recorded and printed material, personal correspondence, and
photographs were subject to confiscation.
The
Government permitted Jews to travel abroad, but often denied them multiple-exit
permits issued to other citizens. Baha'is often experienced difficulty in
obtaining passports.
Women
must obtain the permission of their husband, father, or other male relative to
obtain a passport. Married women must receive written permission from their
husbands before being allowed to leave the country.
The law
contains provisions for granting refugee status to persons who meet the
definition in the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution; however, there were reports that the
Government deported refugees deemed "illegal" entrants into the
country. In times of economic uncertainty, the Government increased pressure on
refugees to return to their home countries. The Government generally cooperated
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees.
The
country hosted a large refugee population, mostly Afghans, as well as a
significant number of Iraqis. At year's end, UNHCR estimated that approximately
1 million refugees from Afghanistan remained in the country. Up to 500,000
Afghan refugees have returned to Afghanistan since early 2002, including
approximately 100,000 during the first half of the year, according to UNHCR. The
Government denied UNHCR concerns that the Government was pressing them to leave.
Most refugees subsisted on itinerant labor. The Government accused many Afghans
of involvement in drug trafficking. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks,
the Government sealed its border in anticipation of a war in Afghanistan and a
resulting wave of refugees. The Government set up several refugee camps just
inside Afghanistan to deal with the crisis.
The UNHCR
estimated that there were approximately 200,000 Iraqi refugees in the country,
the majority of whom were Iraqi Kurds, but also including Shi'a Arabs. Iraq
expelled many of the Iraqi refugees at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war
because of their suspected Iranian origin. In numerous instances, both the
Iraqi and Iranian Governments disputed their citizenship, rendering many of
them stateless. Other Iraqi refugees arrived following Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait in 1990. During the year, the Government took substantial steps to
prepare for the possibility of new Iraqi refugees, but significant outflows
never appeared. In November, UNHCR initiated a pilot repatriation of refugees
from the country and had repatriated a few hundred to Iraq by early December. According
to press reports, refugee officials speculated that up to three-quarters of the
200,000 refugees in the country may have crossed back into Iraq without formal
assistance since April.
Although
the Government claimed to host more than 30,000 refugees of other
nationalities, including Tajiks, Bosnians, Azeris, Eritreans, Somalis,
Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis, it did not provide information about them or
allow the UNHCR or other organizations access to them.
Section 3
Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government
The right
of citizens to change their government is restricted significantly. The Supreme
Leader, the recognized Head of State, is elected by the Assembly of Experts,
and can only be removed by a vote of this same Assembly. The Assembly itself is
restricted to clerics, who serve an 8-year term and are chosen by popular vote
from a list approved by the Government. There is no separation of state and
religion, and clerical influence pervades the Government, especially in
appointed, rather than elected, positions. The Government effectively
controlled the selection of candidates for elections. The Council of Guardians,
which reviews all laws for consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution,
also screens candidates for election for ideological, political, and religious
suitability. It accepts only candidates who support a theocratic state; clerics
who disagree with government policies or with a conservative view of the
Islamic state also have been disqualified. Two bills approved by the Majlis in
late 2002 to expand presidential power and limit the Council of Guardian's
ability to disqualify candidates were rejected by the Council of Guardians at
mid-year.
Regularly
scheduled elections are held for the Presidency, the Majlis, and the Assembly
of Experts. Mohammad Khatami, a former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance
who was impeached in 1992 by the Majlis for "liberalism" and "negligence,"
was elected President in 1997 and reelected in 2001 with 77 percent of the vote.
The UNSR reported that the Guardian Council significantly limited the number of
candidates permitted to run in elections and noted that the Interior Minister
denounced the "unprincipled disqualification" of candidates.
Elections
were held in the fall of 1998 for the 86-member Assembly of Experts. The
Council of Guardians disqualified numerous candidates, which led to criticism
from many observers that the Government improperly predetermined the election
results.
Elections
were last held for the 290-seat Majlis in 2000 and were scheduled to be held
again in February 2004. Of more than 6,000 candidates, the Council of Guardians
disqualified 576 before the 2000 elections, a substantial decrease from the 44
percent of candidates disqualified before the 1996 elections. Most of those
disqualified were outspoken advocates of political reform, including some of
the most prominent supporters of President Khatami. In 2001, by-elections were
held for vacant Majlis seats. The Council of Guardians reportedly disqualified 100
potential candidates, more than one-quarter of those wishing to run. Furthermore,
the Supreme Leader and other conservatives within the Government used
constitutional provisions to block much of the early reform legislation passed
by the Majlis.
In 1999,
elections for nationwide local councils were held for the first time since the 1979
revolution. Government figures indicated that roughly 280,000 candidates
competed for 130,000 council seats across the nation. Women were elected to
seats in numerous districts. However, the Councils did not appear to wield
significant autonomy or authority. A second series of municipal council
elections took place in February. A combination of low voter turnout (below 50
percent) and popular dissatisfaction with both the performance of the councils
and the record of reformists swept many reformists from office.
Women
held 9 out of 290 Majlis seats. There were no female cabinet members, although
several held high-level positions, such as Vice-President, and a woman served
as Presidential Adviser for Women's Affairs, and another as head of the Environmental
Protection Agency.
Majlis
seats were reserved for elected Christian (three), Jewish (one) and Zoroastrian
(one) deputies. Religious minorities were barred from being elected to any
other seats on a representative body and from holding senior government or
military positions.
Section 4
Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation
of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The
Government continued to restrict the work of local human rights groups. The
Government denies the universality of human rights and has stated that human
rights issues should be viewed in the context of a country's "culture and
beliefs."
Various
professional groups representing writers, journalists, photographers, and
others attempted to monitor government restrictions in their fields, as well as
harassment and intimidation against individual members of their professions. However,
their ability to meet, organize, and effect change was curtailed severely by
the Government. There were domestic NGOs working in areas such as health and
population, women and development, youth, environmental protection, human
rights, and sustainable development. Some reports estimate a few thousand local
NGOs currently in operation.
International
human rights NGOs such as HRW and AI were not permitted to establish offices in
or conduct regular investigative visits to the country. Authorities barred HRW
and AI representatives from attending the European Union's late 2002 human
rights talks in Tehran, despite the EU's invitation. An October EU-Iran human
rights dialogue was held in Brussels to facilitate the participation of NGO
representatives. The Government also opened a human rights dialogue with
Australia in 2002 and with Switzerland in October.
The ICRC
and the UNHCR both operated in the country. However, the Government did not
allow the UNSR to visit the country from 1997 to 2001, the last year his
mandate to monitor human rights in the country was in effect. The Government
allowed two visits by U.N. human rights representatives during the year, one by
the UNSR for the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression and one by a U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. In
December, the Plenary of the U.N. 58th General Assembly adopted a resolution
condemning the country for human rights abuses, include public executions,
amputation, torture, suppression of free speech, and discrimination against
women and minorities.
The
Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) was established in 1995 under the
authority of the head of the judiciary, who sits on its board as an observer. In
1996 the Government established a human rights committee in the Majlis, the
Article 90 Commission, which receives and considers complaints regarding
violations of constitutional rights. However, many observers believed that
these committees lacked independence.
In
October, the Article 90 Commission issued a report on the death in custody of
Iranian-Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi. The report identified Tehran's
Chief Prosecutor and other members of the judiciary as being directly involved
in subjecting Kazemi to violent interrogations in Evin Prison, and later
attempting to cover up the cause of her death. The report noted that Kazemi had
applied for and received official government permission to act as a journalist
and photographer while in the country. The Article 90 Commission findings
reportedly dismissed allegations of MOIS involvement in Kazemi's death, though
an MOIS officer was charged with her murder.
In
October, lawyer and human rights activist Shirin Ebadi was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize for her work in advancing human rights both in the country and
internationally. Ms. Ebadi, who served as one of the first female judges in the
country before being forced to resign after the revolution, has campaigned on
behalf of women, children, and victims of government repression. She
represented the family of Darius and Parvaneh Forouhar, killed in 1998, and of
a student killed during the 1999 student protests, which exposed links between
vigilante groups and government officials and led to her arrest in 2000. Ms. Ebadi
is a founder of the Center for the Defense of Human Rights, which represents
defendants in political cases. She has also agreed to represent the family of
Ms. Kazemi.
Section 5
Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or Social Status
In
general the Government did not discriminate on the basis of race, disability,
language, or social status; however, it discriminated on the basis of religion,
sex, and ethnicity. Kurds, Azeris, and Ahwazi Arabs were not allowed to study
their languages.
Women
Although
spousal abuse and violence against women occurred, statistics were not
available. Abuse in the family was considered a private matter and seldom was
discussed publicly. Rape is illegal, and subject to strict penalties, but
remained a widespread problem. The UNSR published statistics provided by the
IHRC indicating that, at the end of 2001, an estimated 1,000 of approximately 3,000
active files were related to women's issues.
Prostitution
was illegal. Accurate information regarding the extent of the problem was not
widely available, although the issue received greater attention as a result of
the public's growing interest in social problems. Press reports described
prostitution as a widespread problem.
Provisions
in the Islamic Civil and Penal Codes, in particular those sections dealing with
family and property law, discriminate against women. Shortly after the 1979
revolution, the Government repealed the Family Protection Law, a hallmark bill
adopted in 1967 that had given women increased rights in the home and
workplace, and replaced it with a legal system based largely on Shari'a
practices. In 1998, the Majlis passed legislation that mandated segregation of
the sexes in the provision of medical care. In August, the Guardian Council
rejected a bill that would require the country to adopt U.N. conventions on
eliminating torture and ending discrimination against women.
Even
though the law permits it, marriage at the minimum age of 9 was rare. In mid-2002,
authorities approved a law that requires court approval for the marriage of
girls below the age of 13 and boys younger than 15. All women must have the
permission of their father or a male relative to marry. The law allowed for the
practice of temporary marriages based on a Shi'a custom in which a woman or a
girl may become the wife of a married or single Muslim male after a simple and
brief religious ceremony. The temporary marriage may last any length of time. According
to Shi'a Islamic law, men may have as many temporary wives as they wish. Such
wives are not granted rights associated with traditional marriage.
The Penal
Code includes provisions for the stoning of women and men convicted of
adultery, although judges were instructed at the end of 2002 to cease imposing
such sentences (see Section 1.c.). Women have the right to divorce if their
husband has signed a contract granting that right or if the husband cannot
provide for his family, is a drug addict, insane, or impotent. However, a
husband is not required to cite a reason for divorcing his wife. In December 2002,
a new law made the adjudication of cases in which women demand divorces less
arbitrary and less costly.
A widely
used model marriage contract limits privileges accorded to men by custom, and
traditional interpretations of Islamic law recognize a divorced woman's right
to a share in the property that couples acquire during their marriage and to
increased alimony. Women who remarry are forced to give the child's father
custody of children from earlier marriages. However, the law granted custody of
minor children to the mother in certain divorce cases in which the father is
proven unfit to care for the child. In November, women were granted the right
to custody of both male and female children up to 7 years of age; previously
divorced women were allowed to retain custody over boys only until 2two years
of age.
The
testimony of a woman is worth half that of a man in court. The "blood
money" paid to the family of a female crime victim is half the sum paid
for a man. A married woman must obtain the written consent of her husband
before traveling outside the country (see Section 2.d.).
Women had
access to primary and advanced education; however, social and legal constraints
limited their professional opportunities. Women were represented in many fields
of the work force, and the Government has not prevented women from entering
many traditionally male-dominated fields. However, women are barred from
seeking the presidency and from appointment to the judiciary. The law provides
maternity, child care, and pension benefits.
The
Government enforced gender segregation in most public spaces, and prohibited
women from mixing openly with unmarried men or men not related to them. Women
must ride in a reserved section on public buses and enter public buildings,
universities, and airports through separate entrances. Women were prohibited
from attending male sporting events, although this restriction did not appear
to be enforced universally. While the enforcement of conservative Islamic dress
codes varied, what women wore in public was not entirely a matter of personal
choice. The authorities sometimes harassed women if their dress or behavior was
considered inappropriate, and women may be sentenced to flogging or
imprisonment for such violations (see Section 1.c.). The law prohibits the
publication of pictures of uncovered women in the print media, including
pictures of foreign women. There are penalties for failure to observe Islamic
dress codes at work.
Children
There is
little current information available to assess Government efforts toward
assuring the welfare of children. Except in isolated areas of the country,
children had access to free education through the 12th grade (compulsory to age
11), and to some form of health care.
There was
not enough information available to reflect how the Government dealt with child
abuse (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
Persons
with Disabilities
There is
no current information available regarding whether the Government has
legislated or otherwise mandated accessibility for persons with disabilities,
or whether discrimination against persons with disabilities is prohibited.
National/Racial/Ethnic
Minorities
The Kurds
sought greater autonomy from the central Government and continued to suffer
from government discrimination. Sunni Kurdish tensions with the Shi'a dominated
government predate the 1979 revolution. Kurds often were suspected of harboring
separatist or foreign sympathies. These suspicions have led to sporadic
outbreaks of fighting between government forces and Kurdish groups. In recent
years, greater Kurdish cultural expression has been allowed and Kurdish
publications and broadcasting have expanded. However, there was still no public
school education in the Kurdish language.
The KDPI
claimed that the Government executed at least four Kurdish party members and
activists during the year. According to KDPI, plainclothes vigilantes in five
separate attacks killed seven more Kurds during the year (see Section 1.a.). Other
activists were reported imprisoned.
Azeris
comprise roughly one-quarter of the country's population and are well
integrated into the Government and society. The Supreme Leader is of Azeri
descent, but complained of ethnic and linguistic discrimination, including
banning the Azeri language in schools, harassing Azeri activists or organizers,
and changing Azeri geographic names. The Government traditionally viewed Azeri
nationalism as threatening, particularly since the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the creation of an independent Azerbaijan. Azeri groups also claimed
that there were a number of Azeri political prisoners jailed for advocating
cultural and language rights for Iranian Azerbaijanis. The Government has
charged several of them with "revolting against the Islamic state."
Foreign
representatives of the Ahwazi Arabs of Khuzistan, whose numbers could range as
high as 4 million or more, claimed that their community in the southwest of the
country suffered from discrimination, including the right to study and speak
Arabic. In July, authorities reportedly closed two bilingual Arabic/Farsi
newspapers, and imprisoned scores of political activists. They asserted that
the Government has ignored their appeals to de-mine the vast stretches of
Khuzistan, mined during the Iran-Iraq War. They further stated that many Arabs,
both Shi'a and Sunni, have been imprisoned and tortured for criticizing
government policies. According to Ahwazi sources, political activist with the
Islamic Wafagh Party, Kazem Mojaddam, was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment in
November after his initial arrest in June on charges of secession and
endangering internal security.
Section 6
Worker Rights
a. The
Right of Association
The Labor
Code provides workers the right to establish unions; however, the Government
did not allow independent unions to exist. A national organization known as the
Workers' House was the sole authorized national labor organization. It served
primarily as a conduit for the Government to exert control over workers. The
leadership of the Workers' House coordinated activities with Islamic labor
councils, which were made up of representatives of the workers and one
representative of management in industrial, agricultural, and service
organizations of more than 35 employees. These councils also functioned as
instruments of government control, although they frequently were able to block
layoffs and dismissals.
According
to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the role of
the Worker's House changed in recent years, and there was more tolerance of
workers' organizations, which included four nurses organizations, a health
workers' union, and a textile workers' union. The report also notes that a 2000
law exempted companies with up to five employees from the need to comply with
labor legislation for 6 years. This law affected approximately 3 million
workers, making them easier to hire and fire. The Labor Code allows employers
and employees to establish guilds. The guilds issued vocational licenses and
helped members find jobs. Instances of late or partial pay for government
workers reportedly were common.
There
were no known affiliations with international labor organizations.
b. The
Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers
did not have the right to organize independently and negotiate collective
bargaining agreements. The ICFTU noted that the presence of security/intelligence
forces in the workplace, as well as increasing use of temporary contracts,
acted as obstacles to organizing.
The law
prohibits public sector strikes and the Government did not tolerate any strike
deemed to be at odds with its economic and labor policies; however, strikes
occurred. In addition to strikes, there were also work stoppages and protests
by oil, textile, electrical manufacturing, and metal workers, as well as by the
unemployed. Many of these protests were due to non-payment of wage arrears,
according to the ICFTU. In May, textile workers in Behshar staged a hunger
strike to protest non-payment of overdue wages. Teachers staged demonstrations
and sit-ins in several cities during the year for improved working conditions
and wage benefits.
It is not
known whether labor legislation and practice in the export processing zones (EPZs)
differ from the law and practice in the rest of the country. According to the
ICFTU, labor legislation did not apply in the EPZs.
c. Prohibition
of Forced or Bonded Labor
The Penal
Code provides that the Government may require any person who does not have work
to take suitable employment; however, this did not appear to be enforced
regularly. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized this
provision frequently as contravening ILO Convention 29 on forced labor. The law
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, this was not enforced
adequately, and such labor by children was a serious problem.
d. Status
of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
The law
prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, there appears to be a
serious problem with child labor. The Labor Law prohibits employment of minors
less than 15 years of age and places restrictions on the employment of minors
under age 18; however, laws pertaining to child labor were not enforced
adequately. The law permits children to work in agriculture, domestic service,
and some small businesses. The law prohibits the employment of women and minors
in hard labor or night work. Information regarding the extent to which these
regulations were enforced was not available.
e. Acceptable
Conditions of Work
The Labor
Code empowers the Supreme Labor Council to establish annual minimum wage levels
for each industrial sector and region; however, no information was available regarding
mechanisms used to set wages. It was not known if the minimum wages were
adjusted annually or enforced. The Labor Code stipulates that the minimum wage
should be sufficient to meet the living expenses of a family and should take
inflation into account. However, under poor economic conditions, many middle-class
citizens must work at two or three jobs to support their families.
The Labor
Code establishes a maximum 6-day, 48-hour workweek, with 1 weekly rest day,
normally Fridays, and at least 12 days of paid annual leave and several paid
public holidays.
According
to the Labor Code, a Supreme Safety Council, chaired by the Labor Minister or
his representative, is responsible for promoting workplace safety and health. Labor
organizations outside the country have alleged that hazardous work environments
were common in the country and have resulted in thousands of worker deaths per
year. It was not known how well the Ministry's inspectors enforced regulations.
It was not known whether workers could remove themselves from hazardous
situations without risking the loss of employment.
f. Trafficking
in Persons
The law
does not specifically prohibit trafficking in persons, and persons reportedly
were trafficked to, through, and from the country during the year. It was
difficult to measure the extent of the Government's efforts to curb human
trafficking, but national and international press reporting indicated that
Tehran has taken action against bandits involved in abducting women and
children and pursued agreements with neighboring states to curb human
trafficking. The Government has also reportedly arrested, convicted, and
executed numerous human trafficking offenders. During the year, police
reportedly arrested numerous members of prostitution rings and closed down
brothels.
In April,
a court in Mashhad reportedly sentenced 53 individuals to 281 years in prison
and 222 lashes on charges of abduction and slavery for trafficking scores of
young girls to Pakistan.
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1. The
United States does not have an embassy in Iran. This report draws heavily on
non-U.S. Government sources.
Copyright © 2003 Women's Freedom Forum, USA