Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices - 2003
Released
by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
On April 9,
Coalition-led forces militarily overthrew the Ba'athist regime of Saddam
Hussein in Operation Iraqi Freedom. [note 1] Under U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 1483, 1500, and 1511, an Interim Administration, comprised of the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council,
administers the country until an internationally recognized, representative
government is established and assumes responsibility.
The
regime's 1968 provisional Ba'athist Constitution claimed the country to be a
democratic republic. However, political power rested exclusively in a harshly
repressive one-party apparatus dominated by Saddam Hussein Al-Tikriti and
members of his extended family. According to the Constitution, the Arab Ba'ath
Socialist Party governed the country through the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),
which exercised both executive and legislative authority. President Saddam
Hussein, who was also Prime Minister, Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary
General of the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party, therefore wielded absolute
decisive power. Hussein and his regime claimed 99.96 percent of the votes cast
in a nondemocratic "referendum" on his presidency held in October 2002
that did not include secret ballots; many credible reports indicated that
voters feared possible reprisal for a dissenting vote. The judiciary was not
independent, and the President had the ability to override any ruling or refer
any case to a secret system of Special Courts outside the normal judiciary.
Under the
RCC and Ba'ath party structure, the Tikriti family maintained total effective
control of the security forces and the military. The regime's security
apparatus included militias attached to the President, the Ba'ath Party, and
the Interior Ministry. The military and these paramilitary forces often played
an internal security role and were central to maintaining the environment of
intimidation and fear on which regime power depended. The regime historically
made little attempt to acknowledge, investigate, or punish officials or members
of the military or security forces accused of human rights abuses; however, in
February 2002, it admitted that state police were commonly accused of human
rights violations. Members of the military and security forces committed numerous,
serious human rights abuses.
The
country has an estimated population of 24.7 million. The regime owned all major
industries and controlled most of the highly centralized economy, which was
based largely on oil production. The Iran-Iraq and gulf wars damaged the
economy, and the country was subject to U.N. sanctions from its 1990 invasion
of
Ethnically
and linguistically the country's population includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen,
Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Armenians. The religious mix likewise is varied and
consists of Shi'a and Sunni Muslims (both Arab and Kurdish), Christians (including
Chaldeans and Assyrians), Kurdish Yazidis, and a small number of Jews, Sabean
Mandaeans, and Baha'i. Civil uprisings have occurred in various areas over the
past 3 decades, especially in Kurdish areas in the North and Shi'a areas in the
South. The minority Arab Sunni regime reacted with extreme repression against
those who opposed or even questioned it. The regime also systematically forced
the removal of ethic minorities under its admitted policy of "Arabizing"
arable land.
The
regime's human rights record remained extremely poor and it continued to commit
numerous, serious human rights abuses. Citizens did not have the right to
change the Government. The regime continued to summarily execute alleged
political opponents and leaders of the Shi'a religious community. Persons were
executed arbitrarily because of their association with an opposition group or
as part of a continuing effort to reduce prison populations. Until its fall,
the regime continued to be responsible for disappearances and to kill and
torture persons suspected of or related to persons suspected of oppositionist
politics, economic crimes, military desertion, and a variety of other
activities. Mass graves related to five major atrocities were identified by
year's end. More remained to be investigated. The number of those buried in the
graves already discovered was difficult to estimate, but many observers
believed that the total will reach 300,000.
Security
forces routinely tortured, beat, raped, and otherwise abused detainees. Prison
conditions were extremely poor and frequently life-threatening. The regime at
times conducted "prison cleansing" campaigns to kill inmates in order
to relieve overcrowding in the prisons. The authorities routinely used
arbitrary arrest and detention, prolonged detention, and incommunicado
detention, and continued to deny citizens the basic right to due process.
Until
April 9, Saddam Hussein and his inner circle of supporters continued to impose
arbitrary rule. The regime continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights. The
regime severely restricted freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, association,
religion, and movement. Violence and discrimination against women occurred. The
regime neglected the health and nutritional needs of children, and
discriminated against religious minorities and ethnic groups. The regime
restricted severely trade union rights. Child labor persisted, and there were
instances of forced labor.
Since the
1991 Kurdish uprising and the regime's subsequent military withdrawal, the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) controlled
most areas in the
The KDP,
PUK, and other opposition groups have committed human rights abuses in the past.
However, prior to the fall of the regime, the PUK and KDP enacted laws
establishing an independent judiciary, providing for freedom of religion,
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, the right to form political parties,
and women's' and workers' rights. According to press reporting and independent
observers, both groups generally observed such laws in practice. In addition,
both the PUK and KDP established human rights ministries to monitor human
rights conditions, to submit reports to relevant international bodies, and to
recommend ways to end abuses
RESPECT
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1
Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
a. Arbitrary
or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
The
regime, in power until the fall of
The
discovery of mass graves, considered to be unmarked sites containing at least
six bodies, provided evidence of the vast dimension of the practice. Immediately
following the fall of the regime and throughout the remainder of the year, mass
graves were reported from sources throughout the country. By the end of the
year, 275 mass graves had been reported to the CPA and 55 of these mass graves
had been confirmed.
Sites
have been discovered in all regions and contained members of every major
religious and ethnic group in the country, as well as foreign citizens,
including Iranian POWs, Kuwaitis and Saudis.
In the 1983
attack against Kurdish citizens, the regime rounded up 8,000 members of the
Barzani tribe in the North and executed them in deserts at great distances from
their homes.
In the 1988
Anfal campaign, as many as 182,000 persons disappeared. Most of the men were
separated from their families and were executed in deserts in the west and
southwest of the country. The remains of some of their wives and children have
also been found in mass graves. Chemical attacks against Kurdish villages from 1986
to 1988, including the Halabja attack, when the Air Force dropped sarin, VX and
tabun chemical agents on the civilian population, killing 5,000 people
immediately and causing long-term medical problems, related deaths, and birth
defects among the children of thousands more.
The 1991
massacre after the Shi'a uprising at the end of the gulf war killed tens of
thousands of Shi'a in such regions as
The 1991
massacre of Kurds targeted civilians and soldiers who fought for autonomy in
the North after the gulf war.
At or
near prisons or military establishments, opponents and critics of the regime
from all religious and ethnic groups were also executed and buried in mass
graves
These
crimes have acquired a measure of notoriety and salience. However, thousands of
other citizens, including Marsh Arabs, Shi'a citizens in the 1970s and 1980s,
and students involved in uprisings in Najaf in 1999 may also be in as-yet
undiscovered mass graves.
There
have also been mass extrajudicial executions of prisoners. In a prison
cleansing campaign between 1997 and 1999 approximately 2,500 prisoners were
executed. In October 2001, 23 political prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib
prison.
The list
of offenses with mandatory death penalties grew substantially in the last years
of the regime and included minor offenses such as smuggling cars and spare
parts. More significantly, the Special Rapporteur has noted that mere
membership in certain political parties was punishable by death, and that fear
of death for any act or expression of dissent was pervasive. There were
recurrent reports of the use of the death penalty for such offenses as "insulting"
the President or the Ba'ath Party. The Special Rapporteur also noted that even
the "suggestion that someone was not a supporter of the President carried
the prospect of the death penalty." In response to the Special
Rapporteur's request for information concerning those executed in 2000 and 2001,
the regime responded that the number was 249 -- for the crimes of homicide,
drug-related offenses and immoral offenses. The Special Rapporteur commented
that compliance with his request was "limited."
Apart
from the mass graves, the regime practiced a policy of selective elimination of
prominent Shi'a clerics and their followers suspected of disloyalty to the
Government. Regime agents publicly targeted family members of defectors and
dissidents for torture and killing (see Section 1.f.). Regime security forces
killed numerous political prisoners, minority group members, criminal suspects,
and others during attempted apprehension or while in custody.
Land
mines continued to kill civilians. Approximately 7 million landmines left over
from the Iran/Iraq war remained in place in the North. PUK representatives
reported that the population living in the region under its control suffered
approximately 250 casualties per month from exploded mines. Many of these
victims died.
In
February 2002, the Minister of Justice specifically informed the Special
Rapporteur that prostitution was not punishable by death under the law and
claimed that no one had been sentenced to death for prostitution in the country
in many years. However, in the past, security forces used allegations of
prostitution to intimidate opponents of the regime. Security forces allegedly
beheaded at least 130 women between June 2000 and April 2001, and an additional
number of men suspected of facilitating such activities in October 2000. Security
agents reportedly decapitated numerous women and men in front of their family
members. According to Amnesty International (AI), the victim's heads were displayed
in front of their homes for several days (see Section 5).
b. Disappearance
There is
a substantial overlap between the victims of arbitrary and unlawful killings
reported in the previous Section and the "disappeared" in this
Section. Those who disappeared frequently belonged to groups whose corpses were
unearthed in mass graves.
Until the
regime's fall, there continued to be widespread reports of disappearances. The
regime did nothing to address accusations of previously reported disappearances.
A large number of citizens remain unaccounted for.
Local
human rights associations, international human rights, representatives of the
CPA, U.N. officials, the U.N. Special Rapporteur, representatives of the
Governing Council, the Interim Authority's Human Rights Ministry, and the
regional human rights ministries in
The
majority of the disappearance cases known to the Special Rapporteur were
persons of Kurdish origin who disappeared during the 1988 Anfal Campaign. The
Special Rapporteur estimated that the total number of Kurds who disappeared
during that period could reach several tens of thousands. Human Rights Watch (HRW)
estimated the total at between 70,000 and 150,000, and AI at more than 100,000.
During the year, the two regional Human Rights Ministers claimed that 182,000
Kurds were executed during the Anfal Campaign. The second largest group of
disappearance cases known to the Special Rapporteur consisted of Shi'a who were
reported to have disappeared in the late 1970's and early 1980's as their
families were expelled to
Hundreds
were still missing in the aftermath of the brief Iraqi military occupation of
Despite
several well-publicized exchanges with
After the
fall of the former regime, officials from the CPA, working with Iraqis, the
Human Rights Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) through the Tripartite Commission process,
have closed 45 cases of Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian missing persons whose corpses
were found in mass graves and confirmed through DNA testing.
Numerous
credible reports have alleged the existence of special prison wards that hold
individuals whose whereabouts, status, and fate were not disclosed (see Section
1.c.).
Few
victims became targets of the regime because of any crime they had committed;
rather, they were arrested and held as hostages in order to force a relative,
who may have escaped abroad, to surrender. Others were arrested because of
their family's link to a political opponent or because of their ethnic origin (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.f.).
c. Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The 1968
Constitution expressly prohibited torture; however, the security services
routinely and systematically tortured detainees. According to former prisoners,
torture techniques included branding, electric shock administered to the
genitals and other areas, beating, removal of fingernails, amputation without
anesthesia, burning with hot irons and blowtorches, suspension from rotating
ceiling fans, dripping of acid on the skin, rape, breaking of limbs, denial of
food and water, extended solitary confinement in dark and extremely small
compartments, and threats to rape or otherwise harm family members and
relatives. Evidence of such torture was often apparent when security forces
returned the mutilated bodies of torture victims to their families. There were
persistent reports that families were made to pay for the cost of executions of
loved ones. Refugees often reported to host governments in a variety of
countries instances of torture, and displayed scars and mutilations to
substantiate their claims. Since the fall of the former regime, Iraqis have
repeatedly and consistently reported to the CPA, human rights organizations,
and the international media that they suffered from these types of torture.
Arrested
persons routinely were subjected to mistreatment, including prolonged
interrogations accompanied by torture, beatings, and various deprivations. Cruel
and unusual punishments prescribed by the law, including amputations and
branding. In 2000, the authorities introduced tongue amputation as a punishment
for persons who criticized Saddam Hussein or his family. Soldiers had their
ears cut off as punishment for desertion. An "X" was branded on their
foreheads so that citizens would not think that they were wounded war veterans.
In February 2002, the Minister of the Interior admitted the existence of this
practice, but claimed "it had now definitively ceased." Since the
fall of the regime, Iraqis with amputated hands, tongues, and ears have
presented themselves to CPA authorities confirming these reports of torture and
seeking assistance.
There
were numerous allegations of politically motivated torture and reports of
torture against family members, including the children, of suspected critics of
the regime. For instance, a health coordinator for the refugee health program
in
Beyond
the use of torture, the regime systematically employed cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment of people for political purposes. Human rights
organizations and opposition groups continued to receive reports of women who
suffered from severe psychological trauma after being raped while in custody. Security
forces also reportedly sexually assaulted and threatened sexual assault against
officials, opposition members and their families, in order to blackmail them
into compliance (see Section 1.f.). This continued an alleged pattern of the
regime's systematic use of rape for political purposes. One former female
prisoner reported to the CPA that she suffered repeated rape, including with
metal objects, and burning of her breasts while in the custody of the former
regime. She showed significant scarring. Former Mukhabarat (Intelligence
Service) member Khalid Al-Janabi reported in 2001 that its Technical Operations
Directorate used rape and sexual assault in a systematic and institutionalized
manner for political purposes. The unit reportedly also videotaped the rape of
female relatives of suspected oppositionists and used the videotapes for
blackmail purposes and to ensure their future cooperation (see Section 1.f.). The
security forces allegedly also raped women who were captured during the Anfal
Campaign in the 1980s and during the 1990 occupation of
Prison
conditions were extremely poor and life-threatening. There reportedly were
numerous official, semi-official, and private prisons throughout the country. Overcrowding
was a serious problem. In February 2002, the Minister of Labor and Social
Affairs admitted to the Special Rapporteur that its prison system was
overcrowded. The regime granted a much-publicized amnesty in October 2002 to
all prisoners except those accused of spying for the
Certain
prisons were infamous for routine mistreatment of detainees and prisoners. Abu
Ghurayb, Baladiat, Makasib, Rashidiya, Radwaniyah, and other prisons reportedly
have torture chambers. Hundreds of Fayli (Shi'a) Kurds and other citizens of
Iranian origin, who had disappeared in the early 1980s during the Iran-Iraq
war, reportedly were being held incommunicado at the Abu Ghurayb prison. There
were numerous mentally ill prisoners at Al-Shamma'iya prison in
The
regime did not permit international monitoring of prisons; however, in 2002 the
Special Rapporteur visited prisons and noted that the Abu Ghurayb prison's
conditions "were appalling."
Kurdish
regional officials reported in 2000 that prisons in the three
d. Arbitrary
Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The
Constitution and the legal code explicitly prohibited arbitrary arrest and
detention; however, the authorities routinely engaged in these practices. The
Special Rapporteur received numerous reports of widespread arbitrary arrest and
detention, often for long periods of time, without access to a lawyer or the
courts. As indicated in the 1999 AI report, "
According
to international human rights groups, numerous foreigners arrested arbitrarily
in previous years also remained in detention. Although no statistics were
available, observers estimated the number of political detainees to be in the
tens of thousands, some of whom have been held for decades. The PUK and the KDP
reportedly hold some political prisoners and detainees in the north of the
country.
e. Denial
of Fair Public Trial
Under the
former regime, the judiciary was not independent, and there was no check on the
President's power to override any court decision. Numerous laws facilitated
continued repression, and the regime used extrajudicial methods to extract
confessions or coerce cooperation. Historically, during the constitutional
monarchy, a Council of Judges administered the judiciary independently of the
executive branch of Government. The Ba'th party abolished the Council of Judges
and placed the regular courts within the Ministry of Justice.
There
were two parallel judicial systems. The regular courts under the Ministry of
Justice dealt with the civil courts, courts of personal status and criminal
courts. In addition to the Court of Appeal, there was the Court of Cassation or
Supreme Court, which was the highest court. The many special courts and
tribunals affiliated with, and supervised by, parts of the executive other than
the Ministry of Justice operated independently of the regular judicial system. For
example, the national security courts tried all cases related to the internal
and external security of the state but also could try criminal cases.
National
security courts had jurisdiction in all cases involving espionage and treason,
peaceful political dissent, smuggling, currency exchange violations, and drug
trafficking. Military officers or civil servants with no legal training headed
these tribunals, which heard cases in secret. Authorities often held defendants
incommunicado and did not permit contact with lawyers (see Section 1.d.). The
courts admitted confessions extracted by torture, which often served as the
basis for conviction (see Section 1.c.). Many cases appeared to end in summary
execution; defendants could appeal to the President for clemency. The Minister
of Justice, in February 2002, claimed that they were staffed with judges from
the regular judiciary, and trials in such courts were conducted with all the
rights and procedures of the normal civil courts. This assertion prompted the
Special Rapporteur to conclude that if this were true, such courts were
unnecessary.
At the
fall of the regime, there were approximately 860 Iraqi judges and prosecutors. A
number were not corrupt, connected to the security court or to high levels of
the Ba'ath Party. Although far from a model of fairness, the judiciary was not
significantly involved in the worst abuses of the prior regime. Pervasive human
rights abuses existed in the regular judicial system, such as the use of
tortured confessions. However, the ordinary courts in the Ministry of Justice
were marginalized due to the regime's mistrust of many of the regular judges.
Bribery
was a chronic problem in the judiciary, as was political influence. The regime
intervened in the ordinary judicial system when a person of influence was
arrested for the commission of an offense that was prosecuted in the Ministry
of Justice Courts or where the victim of the crime had regime ties. However,
judges, at times, demonstrated great courage. In one well-known case, the
regime removed nine judges from the Supreme Court when the facts made the death
penalty inapplicable and they refused to impose the death penalty in a murder
case in which the victim was associated with the regime. In another instance, a
judge was imprisoned when he authored an opinion declaring that a decision of
the RCC was unconstitutional. In another case, the regime refused to appoint an
entire class of judges after 2 years of study at the Judicial Institute because
they did not clap after a speech by Ali Hassan Al-Majid, Saddam Hussein's
cousin who organized the gas killings of the Kurds in 1986.
Procedures
in the regular courts in theory provided for many protections; however, the
regime often assigned to the security courts cases that, on their legal merits,
would appear to fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Trials in
the regular courts were public, and defendants were entitled to counsel, at
regime expense in the case of indigents. Defense lawyers had the right to
review the charges and evidence brought against their clients. There was no
jury system; panels of three judges tried cases. Defendants had the right to
appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the Court of Cassation.
The
regime shielded certain groups from prosecution for alleged crimes. For
example, a 1990 decree granted immunity to men who committed "honor
crimes," a violent assault with intent to commit murder against a women by
a relative for her perceived immodest behavior or alleged sexual misconduct (see
Section 5). A 1992 decree granted immunity from prosecution to members of the
Ba'ath Party and security forces who killed anyone while in pursuit of army
deserters. Unconfirmed but widespread reports indicate that this decree was
applied to prevent trials or punishment of regime officials.
f. Arbitrary
Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The 1968
Constitution prohibited such practices; however, the regime frequently
infringed on citizens' right to privacy, particularly in cases allegedly
involving national security. The law defined security offenses so broadly that
authorities effectively were exempt from the legal requirement to obtain search
warrants, and searches without warrants were commonplace. The regime routinely
ignored constitutional provisions designed to protect the confidentiality of
mail, telegraphic correspondence, and telephone conversations. The regime
periodically jammed news broadcasts from outside the country, including those
of opposition groups (see Section 2.a.). The security services and the Ba'ath
Party maintained pervasive networks of informers to deter dissident activity
and instill fear in the public.
The
authorities systematically detained, abused, and killed family members and
close associates of alleged regime opponents (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.d.,
and 1.g.).
The
regime pursued an Arabization campaign of ethnic cleansing designed to harass
and expel ethnic Kurds and Turkmen from regime-controlled areas. According to
press reports and opposition sources, the regime forcibly displaced hundreds of
families. Since the fall of the regime, citizens throughout the country have
reported histories of forced expulsion from their homes and relocation by the
former regime. It is currently estimated that hundreds of thousands of citizens
were forcibly displaced, although actual numbers are unknown. Large numbers of
these forced relocations occurred in Kirkuk, Sinjar, throughout the southern
Shi'a region, especially in the marshlands and Basra.
Regime
officials also took hostage members of minority groups to intimidate their
families into leaving their home regions (see Sections 1.d., 2.d., and 5). Authorities
demolished the houses and detained and executed family members of Shi'a who
protested regime actions (see sections 1.d. and 1.g.).
The
Special Rapporteur has noted that guilt by association was facilitated by administrative
requirements imposed on relatives of deserters or other perceived opponents of
the regime. For example, conscripts were required to secure a guarantor to sign
a document stating that the named conscript would not desert military service
and that the guarantor would accept personal responsibility if the conscript
deserted. Relatives who did not report deserters could lose their ration cards
for purchasing regime-controlled food supplies, be evicted from their
residences or face the arrest of other family members.
g. Use of
Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal and External
Conflicts
The
authorities detained, abused, and killed family members and close associates of
alleged regime opponents (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.f.). The regime
directed a campaign of intimidation at U.N. and nongovernmental organization (NGO)
relief workers. In 2001, the Foreign Minister threatened to cut official ties
to U.N. workers supervising Oil-for-Food Program distribution in the North, and
to revoke their visas and deport them. In 2001, the regime expelled six U.N. humanitarian
relief workers without explanation.
The
regime continued to "Arabize" certain Kurdish areas, such as the
urban centers of Kirkuk and Mosul, through the forced movement of local
residents from their homes and villages and their replacement by Arabs from
outside the area (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., 2.d., and 5).
Landmines
in the north, mostly planted by the regime before 1991, continued to kill and
maim civilians. Many of the mines were laid during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars;
however, the army failed to clear them before it abandoned the area. Kurdish
officials estimate that at least 7 million landmines remain in place in Kurdish-controlled
areas. Landmines also are a problem along the Iraq-Iran border throughout the
central and southern areas in the country. There is no information regarding
civilian casualties or the regime's efforts, if any, to clear old mine fields
in areas under the central regime's control. According to reports by the U.N. Office
of Project Services, the Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian Peoples' Aid,
landmines have killed more than 3,000 persons in the three northern provinces
since the 1991 uprising. PUK officials have estimated that mine casualties in
its area of control occur at a rate of approximately 250 per month. The Special
Rapporteur repeatedly reminded the regime of its obligation under the Landmines
Protocol to protect civilians from the effects of mines. Various NGOs continued
efforts to remove landmines from the area and increase awareness of mines among
local residents. PUK officials have stated that the regime repeatedly refused
requests to provide maps of known minefields (see Section 1.a.).
The
regime continued to attack Shi'a worshippers (see Section 1.a.). For example,
following the 1999 killing of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq Al-Sadr and his sons,
security forces reportedly killed and tortured hundreds of alleged supporters
of Al-Sadr. In 1999 and 2000, as a reprisal for the disturbances following Al-Sadr's
killing, the regime expelled approximately 4,000 Shi'a families from Baghdad.
After the
1991 Gulf War, victims and eyewitnesses described war crimes perpetrated by the
regime, including deliberate killing, torture, rape, pillage, and hostage-taking.
The remains of Kuwaiti and Saudi citizens captured during the gulf war were
discovered in mass graves in during the year, and showed evidence of summary
execution.
Section 2
Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom
of Speech and the Press
The 1968
Constitution provided for freedom of speech and of the press "in
compliance with the revolutionary, national, and progressive trend;" however,
in practice the regime did not permit freedom of speech or of the press, and
did not tolerate political dissent in areas under its control.
The
regime, the Ba'ath Party, or persons close to Saddam Hussein owned all print
and broadcast media, and operated them as propaganda outlets. They generally
did not report opposing points of view that were expressed either domestically
or abroad. Several statutes and decrees suppressed freedom of speech and of the
press.
The
Ministry of Culture and Information periodically issued general guidelines for
the press. Foreign journalists had to work from offices located within the
ministry building and were accompanied everywhere by ministry officers, who
reportedly restricted their movements and made it impossible for them to
interact freely with citizens.
According
to the Special Rapporteur, citizen journalists were under continuous pressure
to join the Ba'ath party and had to follow the mandates of the Iraqi Union of
Journalists, headed by the President's son, Uday Hussein.
The
regime regularly jammed foreign news broadcasts (see Section 1.f.). Availability
of satellite dishes, modems, and fax machines was highly restricted. Regime-controlled
areas had two terrestrial television channels, the official Iraq Television,
and Youth TV, owned by Uday Hussein, who also controlled the satellite
television service. According to press reports, Internet service was available
but highly restricted by the regime. Reportedly, only 500 computers had links
to the web within regime-controlled areas and these access points were closely
censored. Books could be published only with the authorization of the Ministry
of Culture and Information. The Ministry of Education often sent textbooks with
pro-regime propaganda to Kurdish regions, which the Kurds routinely removed
The
regime did not respect academic freedom and exercised strict control over
academic publications and foreign travel by academics. University, secondary
and primary school employees were hired and fired depending on their support
for the regime.
b. Freedom
of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The 1968
Constitution provided for freedom of assembly; however, the regime restricted
this right in practice. Citizens could not assemble legally other than to
express support for the regime, which regularly orchestrated crowds to
demonstrate support for the regime and its policies through financial
incentives for those who participated and threats of violence against those who
did not.
The
Constitution provided for freedom of association; however, the regime
restricted this right in practice. The regime controlled the establishment of
political parties, regulated their internal affairs, and monitored their
activities. New political parties had to be based in Baghdad and were
prohibited from having any ethnic or religious character. A 1999 law stipulated
that new parties had to "take pride" in the 1958 and 1968
revolutions, which created the republic and brought the Ba'ath party to power. Several
parties were outlawed, and membership in them was a capital offense (see
Section 3). The law prescribed the death penalty for anyone "infiltrating"
the Ba'ath Party.
c. Freedom
of Religion
The
Constitution provided for freedom of religion provided that it does not violate
"morality and public order""; however, the regime severely
limited freedom of religion in practice. Islam is the official state religion. The
Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs monitored places of worship,
appointed the clergy, approved the building and repair of all places of
worship, and approved the publication of all religious literature.
More than
95 percent of the population is Muslim. The (predominantly Arab) Shi'a
constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority, while Sunni make up 32 to 37 percent (approximately
18 to 20 percent are Sunni Kurds, 13 to 16 percent are Sunni Arabs, and the
rest are Sunni Turkmen). The remaining approximately 5 percent consist of
Christians--Chaldeans (Roman Catholic), Assyrians (Church of the East), Syriac (Eastern
Orthodox), and Armenian Orthodox--Yazidis, and a small number of Jews and Sabean
Mandaeans.
The
regime did not recognize political organizations formed by Shi'a Muslims or
Assyrian Christians. There were religious qualifications for government office.
Various
segments of the Sunni Arab community, which itself constitutes a minority of
the population, effectively controlled the Government since independence in 1932.
Sunni Arabs were at a distinct advantage in all areas of secular life,
including civil, political, military, and economic. Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are
not distinct ethnically. Shi'a Arabs have supported an independent country
alongside Sunni Arabs since the 1920 Revolt, many joined the Ba'ath Party, and
Shi'a formed the core of the army in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Shi'a Arabs,
the religious majority of the population, have long been economically,
politically, and socially disadvantaged. Like the Sunni Kurds and other ethnic
and religious groups in the North, the regime targeted Shi'a Arabs in the south
for particular discrimination and abuse.
For
decades, the regime conducted a brutal campaign of murder, summary execution,
and protracted arbitrary arrest against the religious leaders and followers of
the majority Shi'a population (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 1.g.). Despite
nominal legal protection of religious equality, the regime severely repressed
the Shi'a clergy and those who follow the Shi'a faith. Forces from the
Mukhabarat, General Security (Amin Al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos
(Fedayeen Saddam), and the Ba'ath Party killed senior Shi'a clerics, desecrated
Shi'a mosques and holy sites, and interfered with Shi'a religious education. Security
agents were stationed at all major Shi'a mosques and shrines and searched,
harassed, and arbitrarily arrested worshipers.
The
following regime restrictions on religious rights remained in effect until
April: Restrictions and outright bans on communal Friday prayer by Shi'a;
restrictions on the loaning of books by Shi'a mosque libraries; a ban on the
broadcast of Shi'a programs on regime-controlled radio or television; a ban on
the publication of Shi'a books, including prayer books and guides; a ban on
funeral processions other than those organized by the regime; a ban on other
Shi'a funeral observances such as gatherings for Koran reading; and the
prohibition of certain processions and public meetings that commemorate Shi'a
holy days. Shi'a groups report that they captured documents from the security
services during the 1991 uprising that listed thousands of forbidden Shi'a
religious writings.
Shi'a
groups reported numerous instances of religious scholars being subjected to
arrest, assault, and harassment in the last several years of the regime,
particularly in the internationally renowned Shi'a academic center of Najaf. In
2000, AI reported that the regime systematically deported tens of thousands of
Shi'a (both Arabs and Kurds) to Iran in the late 1970s and early 1980s, on the
basis that they were of Persian descent. According to Shi'a sources, religious
scholars and Shi'a merchants who supported the schools financially were the
principal targets for deportation. After the 1991 popular uprising, the regime
relaxed some restrictions on Shi'a attending the schools. However, the revival of
the schools appears to have exceeded greatly the regime's expectations, and led
to an increased crackdown on the Shi'a religious establishment, including the
requirement that speeches by imams in mosques be based upon regime-provided
material that attacked fundamentalist trends.
The
regime consistently politicized and interfered with religious pilgrimages, both
of Iraqi Muslims who wished to make the Hajj to Mecca and Medina and of Iraqi
and non-Iraqi Muslim pilgrims who traveled to holy sites within the country (see
Section 2.d.).
Twice
each year--on the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muharram and 40 days later in
the month of Safar--Shi'a pilgrims from throughout the country and around the
world travel to Karbala to commemorate the death there centuries ago of the
Imam Hussein. The regime for several decades interfered with these Ashura
commemorations by preventing processions on foot into the city. In 2000,
security forces opened fire on persons who attempted to walk from Al-Najaf to
Karbala (see Section 1.g.).
The
regime also sought to undermine the identity of minority Christian (Assyrian
and Chaldean) and Yazidi groups.
The
regime engaged in various abuses against the country's estimated 350,000
Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, especially in terms of forced movements from
northern areas and repression of political rights (see Section 2.d.). Most
Assyrians live in the northern provinces, and the regime often accused them of
collaborating with Iraqi Kurds. Military forces destroyed numerous Assyrian
churches during the 1988 Anfal Campaign and reportedly tortured and executed
many Assyrians.
d. Freedom
of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The
regime restricted movement within the country of citizens and foreigners. Police
checkpoints were common on major roads and highways. Persons who entered
sensitive border areas and numerous designated security zones were subject to
arrest.
The
regime required citizens to obtain specific regime authorization and expensive
exit visas for foreign travel. Citizens could not make more than two trips
abroad annually. Before traveling abroad, citizens were required to post
collateral, which was refundable only upon their return. Women were not
permitted to travel outside the country alone; male relatives had to escort
them (see Section 5).
The law
provided for additional penalties for citizens who attempted to leave the
country illegally. Under the law, a prison term of up to 10 years and "confiscation
of movable and immovable property" could be imposed on anyone who
attempted to leave illegally. Similar penalties were given to anyone found to
encourage or assist persons banned from travel, including health care
professionals, engineers, and university professors.
The regime
restricted foreign travel by journalists, authors, university professors,
doctors, scientists, and all employees of the Ministry of Information. Security
authorities interrogate all media employees, journalists, and writers upon
their return from foreign travel.
The
regime consistently politicized and interfered with religious pilgrimages, both
of Muslim citizens who wished to make the Hajj to Mecca and Medina and of
citizen and non-citizen Muslim pilgrims to holy sites in the country (see
Section 2.c.).
Non-Arab
citizens were forced to either change their ethnicity on their identity
documents and adopt Arabic names or be expelled to the Kurd-controlled northern
provinces. Persons could avoid expulsion if they relinquished their Kurdish,
Turkmen, Chaldean, or Assyrian identity and registered as Arabs. Persons who
refused to relinquish their identity had their assets expropriated and their
ration cards withdrawn prior to being deported. Those expelled were not
permitted to return. Citizens who provided employment, food, or shelter to
returning or newly arriving Kurds were also subject to arrest.
According
to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), hundreds of thousands of
refugees remained abroad. Apart from those suspected of sympathizing with Iran,
most fled after the regime's suppression of the civil uprising of 1991; others
are Kurds who fled during the Anfal Campaign of 1988. Of the 1.5 million
refugees who fled following the 1991 uprisings, the great majority,
particularly Kurds, repatriated themselves in northern areas outside of regime
control.
The
regime did not provide asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, did not
cooperate with the UNHCR, and did not respect the rights of refugees.
Section 3
Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government
Under the
regime, citizens did not have the right to change their government. The
President wielded power over all instruments of government. Most important
officials either were members of Saddam Hussein's family or were family allies
from his hometown of Tikrit.
There
were strict qualifications for parliamentary candidates; by law the candidates
for the National Assembly had to be over 25 years old and "believe in God,
the principles of the July 17-30 revolution, and socialism." Elections for
the National Assembly were held in March 2000; 220 of the 250 parliamentary
seats were contested and presidential appointees filled the 30 remaining seats.
Out of the 250 seats, members of the Ba'ath reportedly won 165 seats,
independents won 55, and the President appointed 30 Ba'ath party members to
represent the northern provinces. According to the Special Rapporteur, the
Ba'ath Party allegedly instructed a number of its members to run as nominally
independent candidates. Uday Hussein was elected to the National Assembly by 99.9
percent of the vote.
Full
political participation at the national level was restricted to members of the
Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party, who were estimated to constitute approximately 8
percent of the population. The political system was dominated by the Party,
which governed through the RCC. President Saddam Hussein headed the Council. The
RCC exercised both executive and legislative authority. The RCC dominated the
executive branch and the National Assembly, which was completely subordinate to
it.
Opposition
political organizations were illegal and severely suppressed. Membership in
certain political parties was punishable by death.
The
regime did not recognize the various political groupings and parties that were
formed by Shi'a Muslims, Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen, or other communities. These
political groups continued to attract support despite their illegal status.
The law
provides for the election of women and minorities to the National Assembly;
however, representation was token.
Section 4
Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation
of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The
regime did not permit the establishment of independent human rights
organizations. Monitors from most foreign and international human rights groups
were not allowed in the country.
The
regime operated an official human rights group that routinely denied
allegations of abuses.
Section 5
Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or Social Status
The 1968
Constitution and the legal system provided for some rights for women, children,
and minorities; however, in practice the regime systematically violated these
rights.
Women
Domestic
violence against women occurred but little is known about its extent. Such
abuse customarily was addressed within the tightly knit family structure. There
was no public discussion of the subject, and no statistics were published. Under
the Constitution, spousal violence constituted grounds for divorce and could be
prosecuted; however, suits brought on such charges reportedly were rare. Under
a 1990 law, men who committed honor crimes could receive immunity from
prosecution (see Section 1.e.).
Law
prohibited rape; however, security forces routinely raped family members of
persons in the opposition as punishment (see section 1.c). Prostitution is
illegal. The regime denied claims that it beheaded women accused of
prostitution (see Section 1.a.).
Children
No
information was available regarding whether the regime enacted specific
legislation to promote the welfare of children. However, the Special Rapporteur
and several human rights groups have collected a substantial body of evidence
indicating the regime's continued disregard for the rights and welfare of
children.
The
regime's management of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program did not take into account
the special requirements of children between the ages of 1 and 5, despite the U.N.
Secretary General's specific injunction that the regime modify its
implementation procedures to address the needs of this vulnerable group. In 1999,
UNICEF issued the results of the first surveys of child and maternal mortality
in the country that have been conducted since 1991. The surveys were conducted
in 1999, in cooperation with the regime in the southern and central regions,
and in cooperation with the local Kurdish authorities in the North. The surveys
revealed that in the south and central parts of the country, home to 85 percent
of the population, children under 5 years old were dying at more than twice the
rate that they were a decade before. In contrast, mortality rates for children
less than 5 years old in the Kurdish-controlled North dropped in the period
between 1994 and 1999. The Special Rapporteur criticized the regime for "letting
innocent people suffer while [it] maneuvered to get sanctions lifted." Had
the regime not waited 5 years to adopt the Oil-for-Food Program in 1996, he
stated in October 1999, "millions of innocent people would have avoided
serious and prolonged suffering."
The
regime held 3-week training courses in weapons use, hand-to-hand fighting,
rappelling from helicopters, and infantry tactics for children between 10 and 15
years of age. Camps for these "Saddam Cubs" operated throughout the
country. Senior military officers who supervised the course noted that the
children held up under the "physical and psychological strain" of
training that lasted for as long as 14 hours each day. Families reportedly were
threatened with the loss of their food ration cards if they refused to enroll
their children in the course. Similarly, authorities reportedly withheld school
examination results to students unless they registered in the Fedayeen Saddam
organization (see Section 1.f.)
Regime
officials allegedly took children from minority groups in order to intimidate
their families to leave cities and regions in which the regime wishes to create
a Sunni Arab majority (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.).
Persons
with Disabilities
No
information was available regarding the regime's policy towards persons with
disabilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic
Minorities
The
country's cultural and linguistic diversity was not reflected in the regime's
political and economic structure. Non-Arabs were denied equal access to
employment, education, and physical security. Non-Arabs were not permitted to
sell their homes except to Arabs, nor to register or inherit property. As part
of its "Arabization" policy, the regime forcibly forcibly the non-Arab
population, including Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians living in Kirkuk, Sinjar,
and other districts (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). Similarly, the regime forced
many Arabs to relocate to regions forcibly vacated by other groups. Both major
Kurdish political parties have indicated that the regime occasionally targeted
Assyrians, as well as ethnic Kurds and Turkmen, in expulsions from Kirkuk in
order to attempt to "Arabize" the city (see Section 2.d.).
Assyrians
and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a distinct ethnic group, as well as
the descendants of some of the earliest Christian communities. These
communities speak a different language (Syriac), preserve traditions of
Christianity, and have a rich cultural and historical heritage that they trace
back more than 2,000 years. Although these groups do not define themselves as
Arabs, the regime, without any historical basis, defined Assyrians and
Chaldeans as such, evidently to encourage them to identify with the Sunni-Arab
dominated regime (see Section 2.c.).
The
regime did not permit education in languages other than Arabic and Kurdish. In
areas under regime control, Assyrian and Chaldean children were not permitted
to attend classes in Syriac.
The
Constitution did not provide for a Yazidi identity. Many Yazidis consider
themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, although some would define themselves as
both religiously and ethnically distinct from Muslim Kurds. However, the
regime, without any historical basis, defined the Yazidis as Arabs. There was
evidence that the regime compelled this re-identification to encourage Yazidis
to join in domestic military action against Muslim Kurds. Captured regime
documents included in a 1998 HRW report describe special all-Yazidi military
detachments formed during the 1988-89 Anfal campaign to "pursue and attack"
Muslim Kurds. The regime imposed the same repressive measures on Yazidis as on
other groups (see Section 2.c.).
Citizens
of Iranian origin were required to carry special identification and often are
precluded from desirable employment; the regime deported hundreds of thousands
of citizens of Iranian origin.
Section 6
Worker Rights
a. The
Right of Association
The
regime controlled all trade unions. The Trade Union Organization Law of 1987
established the Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions (IGFTU), a regime-controlled
trade union structure, as the sole legal trade federation. The IGFTU was linked
to the Ba'ath Party, which used it to promote party principles and policies
among union members.
Workers
in private and mixed enterprises, but not public employees or workers in state
enterprises, had the right to join local union committees. The committees were
affiliated with individual trade unions, which in turn belonged to the IGFTU.
The Labor
Law restricted the right to strike. According to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, such restrictions on the right to strike
include penal sanctions. No strike has been reported during the past 2 decades.
The IGFTU
was affiliated with the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and
the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
In the
Kurd-controlled northern region, the law allows persons to form and join trade
unions and other organizations, and to use such organizations for political
action. Dozens of trade groups have been formed since 1991.
b. The
Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The
regime did not recognize the right to bargain collectively. The regime set
salaries for public sector workers, the majority of employed persons. Wages in
the much smaller private sector were set by employers or negotiated
individually with workers. Public sector workers frequently were shifted from
one job and work location to another to prevent them from forming close
associations with other workers. The Labor Code did not protect workers from
anti-union discrimination, an omission that was criticized repeatedly by the
Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization (ILO).
The Labor
Law also restricted the right to strike. According to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, such restrictions on the right to strike
included penal sanctions.
There
were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition
of Forced or Bonded Labor
The law
prohibits forced labor; however, the Penal Code mandated prison sentences,
including compulsory labor, for civil servants and employees of state
enterprises for breaches of labor "discipline," including resigning
from a job. According to the ILO, foreign workers in the country were prevented
from terminating their employment and returning to their native countries
because of regime-imposed penal sanctions on persons who did so. There is no
information available regarding forced and bonded labor by children under the
former regime.
d. Status
of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
The
regime prohibited the employment of children under the age of 14, except in
small-scale family enterprises. However, children reportedly were encouraged
increasingly to work in order to help support their families because of the
country's harsh economic conditions. The law stipulated that employees between
the ages of 14 and 18 should work fewer hours per week than adults. Each year
the regime enrolled children as young as 10 years of age in a paramilitary
training program (see Section 5).
e. Acceptable
Conditions of Work
There was
no information available regarding regime minimum wages. Most workers in urban
areas worked a 6-day, 48-hour workweek. The head of each ministry set hours for
regime employees. Working hours for agricultural workers varied according to
individual employer-employee agreements.
f. Trafficking
in Persons
There was
no information available regarding whether the law prohibited trafficking in
persons, or whether persons were trafficked to, from, or within the country.
----------
1. This
report draws to a large extent on non-U.S. Government sources. The Coalition
Provisional Authority has furnished additional information. This 2003 report
covers the human rights record of the regime of Saddam Hussein until its fall
on April 9
Copyright © 2003 Women's Freedom Forum, USA